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Forum
The Lisbon Agenda of 2000 confidently
assumed that Europe could combine
competitiveness with reinforced employee rights.
When it was re-launched in 2005, convinced
believers in the former EU-15 were hard to find.
Globalisation and enlargement had hollowed it
out. Besides which, different actors with different
interests saw it differently. Some saw it as a call
for more flexible production with reinforced
rights, or flexibility-by-consent, notably, the
ETUC, whose general secretary John Monks,
forwarded a proposal on these lines to the
employers’ federation UNICE in 20042. Others
took it as a call for more flexible labour markets
and reduced employee rights, or flexibility-by-
constraint. The ‘consent’ view focussed on
promoting innovation by reinforcing rights; the
‘constraint’ view focussed on cutting costs and
reducing them. Given the choice, most
management preferred the constraint option. 
The Lisbon Agenda has been more cited than
read, especially by much of the European
press. In fact it called for: 
‘giving higher priority to lifelong learning as a
basic component of the European social
model, including encouraging agreements
between the social partners on innovation
and lifelong learning; by exploiting the
complementarity between lifelong learning
and adaptability through flexible management
of working time and job rotation (and)
furthering all aspects of equal opportunities,
including reducing occupational segregation,
and making it easier to reconcile working life
and family life (European Council, 2000).
Lisbon, in these senses, was a call less for
reform of labour markets than for a renewal of
the European social model based on both
economic efficiency and social consent (EU
Commission, 1993). The background case
behind this call was for innovation-by-
agreement between social partners, which
had been argued in an earlier report to
Jacques Delors (Holland, 1993), and invited
by the Portuguese Presidency of the
European Council (Holland, 2000). This paper
extends this reasoning and draws upon
methodologies which we have independently
and jointly developed, including a project for
the European Commission to follow through
the commitment of the Lisbon Agenda to
lifelong learning (Oliveira, 2003). 
It does so first by considering contrasts
between flexible labour market theory and
flexible production theory. Second, it
addresses the widespread presumption that
the ‘flexible production debate’ is over, or its
claims exaggerated, suggesting inversely that
its implications for western economic and
management theory and practice have been
understated. Third, it addresses the degree to
which effective flexible production depends
on explicating tacit knowledge, latent abilities
and implicit skills within organisations. Fourth
it suggests that social dialogue on the basis
of principles of feasible mutual advantage for
organisations and their employees can
operationalise the principles of Lisbon
Agenda and enhance both economic and
social efficiency, before drawing some
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conclusions concerning the relation of
economic and social efficiency in terms of
enhancing competitiveness by more flexibly
meeting employee needs. 
Gosta Esping-Andersen and Marino Regini
(2000) have observed that ‘worker protection
is not just a matter of welfare, but also may
be conducive to efficiency’. They admit that
hard trade-offs are involved. Yet add that:
‘Firms - and entire nations - which choose to
compete on quality rather than mere price,
need a qualified, dependable and cooperative
workforce. Cheap labour cannot guarantee
such qualities… As a growing literature
attests, markets alone are not very capable of
assuring adequate workforce training. Over
deregulated markets may engender a low skill
equilibrium, the long run effect of which is
productivity lag and loss of competitiveness’. 
Flexibility-by-Constraint
Since EU enlargement, few firms in the former
EU-15 have been impressed by this argument.
Notably, since 2004, leading companies have
opted for flexible working time by constraint.
Siemens led the way by proposing in the
spring of 2004 to move 2.000 jobs in two plant,
producing cordless and mobile phones, from
North Rhine Westphalia to Hungary. In June
2004, the workers at both German plant
agreed to work 40 rather than 35 hours a week
in return for a commitment not to move the
jobs out of the country until 2012, and to do so
for no increase in pay. Within a week, Daimler-
Chrysler announced that it also wanted to
increase working time from 35 to 40 hours for
no pay increase. Karstadt-Quelle, a
department store and mail order company,
announced its intention to do the same, as did
Thomas Cook in Germany, and Continental
Tyre (Münchau & Atkins, 2004). 
This challenge rapidly leapt borders. In France,
within days of the Siemens deal, Bosch gained
an agreement from a majority of its workers at
a components plant near Lyon to do an extra
hour a week without extra pay. The sanction
was otherwise relocating in the Czech
Republic. By December 2005 Bosch also was
seeking a 40 hour week for no extra pay.
Dozens of other companies followed suit
including EADs, the giant high tech
engineering and defence group, which is a
major shareholder in Airbus. Hewlett Packard
was offering to reduce job cuts in France by a
quarter in return for longer hours, but while still
planning to move most abroad (Hollinger,
2005). This was despite landmark legislation in
France only a few years earlier for a 35 hour
week. By the end of 2005, according to official
figures, French workers on average already
were working 39 hours a week (Hollinger, ibid). 
Suzanne Berger (2006) recently has argued
that there are two strategic choices for
enterprise faced with the option of gaining
access to lower cost labour: reorganise or
relocate. The German and French firms which
just have lowered unit labour costs by gaining
longer hours for the same pay are playing a
variant on this: cooperate or we relocate. And
their strategy is consistent with the insider-
outsider model of Assar Lindbeck and Dennis
Snower (1988) that their competitiveness is in
question because insiders within strongly
unionised companies defend high wages and
benefits against outsiders who would be
prepared to work longer for less on both
accounts. The sanction of relocating to where
labour costs and benefits are lower is a
variant on this theme, which itself has wide
support in German management thinking.
Hans Werner Sinn, head of the Ifo institute in
Berlin, claimed that a 42 hour working week -
a net average increase of seven hours -
should be the German industry norm (Sinn,
2003). Klaus Zimmermann, head of the less
conservative DIW institute in Berlin called for
more than double this increase to a standard
50 hour week (Münchau & Atkins, 2004). 
Such claims can be challenged on
macroeconomic grounds. For instance, in
contrast with the claim of allegedly inefficient
European labour with more productive US
labour, productivity per hour worked is higher in
France than in the US. Nor are longer hours in
themselves either a necessary or sufficient
condition for international competitiveness.
Germany in 2004 overtook the US as the
leading export economy in the world. Since in
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1. Conflicting Flexibility Paradigms
population terms it has less than a third of the
population of the United States, this indicates
that Germany as a whole is more than three
times as competitive as the United States.
Besides, where Germany domestic productivity
may be low, this is much related to low growth
in its domestic market, attributable less to the
flexibility or otherwise of its labour markets than
to constraints from the EU’s stability pact
(Rühmann, 2004; Soukiazis & Castro, 2005).
Flexibility-by-Consent
Also, behind the different views of the flexibility
debate, there is a paradox. It is not flexible
labour markets which give leading Japanese
firms such as Toyota a competitive advantage
over their global competitors but flexible
production, product innovation and continuous
improvements in methods of work organisation
(Colenso, 2000; Womack & Jones, 2005).
Japanese firms emulating the Toyota
production system have achieved this because
they guarantee their core employees lifetime
employment and profit sharing. It is precisely
because they are ‘insiders’, with both job
security and a share in the success of the firm,
that they are so willing to propose innovative
methods of work operation. (Womack, et al.,
1990; Womack & Jones, 2005). And flexible
production is a global winner. In 1946 Toyota
was producing only as many vehicles in a year
as General Motors was producing in a day. By
the early 1980’s its output already was half that
of GM, and now it is set to overtake GM to
become the world’s no 1. automobile producer
(The Economist, 2004b, 2005). 
The Japanese flexible or ‘lean’ production
paradigm reverses the Lindbeck-Snower
(1988) ‘insider-outsider’ model and also the
western flexible labour market model.
Western firms, as in a standard Cobb-
Douglas production function, have tended to
treat capital as a fixed cost and labour as a
variable cost. But because of their
commitment to lifetime employment, the
companies leading Japanese firms have to
treat labour as a fixed cost. It is this that
drives them to improve and diversify their
investment by long-term process and product
innovation to ensure efficiency and
competitiveness. Nor have Lindbeck and
Snower (1988) tried to reconcile the
Japanese combination of lifetime employment
and flexible production with their ‘insider-
outsider’ model. Snower has admitted that
they have not even looked at it3. Paul
Samelson (2004), and Gomory and Baumol
(2004) have explained much of what is
happening in terms of downwards wage
pressure with globalisation in terms of factor
price equalisation. But, again, as with the
Lindbeck-Snower (1988) model this stays
within a standard Cobb Douglas production
function in which innovation, or technical
progress, or labour skills, or operational
culture are residuals, if they feature at all. 
By contrast, the Japanese have come closest
to Schumpeter’s (1949) claim that innovation
merits being seen as itself a value-creating
factor of production. Innovation as a strategy
has been typical of most leading Japanese
firms since the 1973 oil shock. While western
companies then cut costs by reducing labour,
or as now by downsizing or demanding longer
hours, the Japanese leaders, encouraged by
the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (Okimoto, 1989) innovated their way
out of global recession from the 70’s by
bringing forward R&D and accelerating
introduction of the range of products in which
they now dominate world markets. We later
suggest that these central differences in
production and labour relations paradigms
have been missed by those critics of
Japanese flexible production who see it only
as a more sophisticated form of Fordism, or
cost cutting, because it also is mass
production. We also submit that many
commentators who have seen the later trend
to ‘in house’ company unions in Japan, have
missed key role played by trades unions in
the origin of the Toyota production system
and the social partnership central to it. 
Kenichi Toyoda, whose family name means
rich rice field, had been producing staff cars or
the Japanese military during WW2 and with a
depressed civilian market, in 1946, was only
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3 When one of us put this point at the launch of their joint book by Dennis Snower in London in 1988, he
replied: ‘I don’t know about Japan. It may be different’.
producing a few thousand vehicles a year. He
had visited Ford’s River Rouge plant in the
States and realised that he could not possibly
achieve high volume Fordist economies of
scale. Instead, in 1950, he opted for cuts in
labour costs and benefits, as European
producers now are. But, under the US
occupation, Japanese trades unions enjoyed
rights drafted by American New Dealers who
had failed to get them accepted in the States
in the thirties, including the right to occupy a
plant if not consulted on redundancies. They
did so, brought Toyoda to his knees, and
thereby opened the dialogue which resulted in
an end to job demarcation, the introduction of
multi-tasking and multi-skilling, and
economies of scope. Most centrally they
gained the right to profit sharing and lifetime
employment which assured the crucial
condition for continuous improvement that
workers could see that innovations in terms of
work operation were to the mutual advantage
of themselves as well as the management.
Sensitive to the fact that he needed a better
brand name than ‘rich rice field’ Kenichi
Toyoda had gained advice that changing the
‘d’ to a ‘t’ in the family name would suffice
since Toyota, in Japanese, meant nothing.
Now it means near everything in terms of a
post Fordist production paradigm (Womack, et
al., 1990 and direct enquiry). 
One of the key advances in economies of
scope, or gaining more from the same capital
equipment, was reducing die changes on
giant cold steel presses for body parts from
three weeks to a few minutes. The US auto
majors could afford to take three weeks, since
this suited their by then well established
‘planned obsolescence’ strategy of
introducing new models annually in the
autumn. Workers during the summer holiday
break would fit, test and then fix the new dyes
for pressing new body parts for each new
model on its dedicated assembly line. It was
by positioning the dyes horizontally, rolling
them into place and fitting them with clips,
that Toyota’s engineers and workers
managed to reduce changing them from three
weeks to three minutes. Combined with other
advances such as just-in-time delivery of
parts to the point of assembly, or kanban, this
meant that Toyota could produce more than
one vehicle on one assembly line. Just-in-
time parts delivery rather than Henry Ford’s
just-in-case stocking of parts reduced costs
by a tenth or more (Womack et al., 1990).
Also, unlike earlier practice by the US auto
majors, and following Toyota’s example,
Japanese workers can stop the production
line if a fault is going through which,
essentially, is how they have achieved fault-
free production.
Big Leaps – Small Steps
Kaizen or ‘continuous improvement’ is more
important in terms of understanding the
efficiency gains of leading Japanese firms
than just-in-time delivery or kanban, most of
which the US and European auto majors
have replicated. Kanban has been crucial in
reducing or eliminating stocks, and also has
been improved over time. Kanban in Japan
was improved after its introduction by
enabling the components for an individual
product, such as a car, to be customized to
the specifications of individual consumers
who then were delivered ‘their car’ within
days of ordering it, Some US and European
producers have achieved a high degree of
product customization, notably Dell in
computers, which is a key feature of its
success. Volkswagen’s Autoeuropa plant in
Portugal has brought this to a fine art, and
can make multiple variants of the same model
on the same assembly line (FEUC
Autoeuropa, 2004). Inversely some auto
producers such as DaimlerChrysler are
concerned that relocating entire plant will
seriously disrupt the kanban system, which
works best when the component suppliers
either are local or not distant, and already
have been successful on the basis of both
iterative trial and error, and mutual trust. This
in turn echoes a wider point made by Berger
(2006) in that a unit cost gain in terms of
wages and benefits from relocation may be
nullified by a loss in the efficiency derived
from both current skills and previous
experience.
In terms of learning from or at work, Toyota
gives the equivalent of seven years retraining
either formally, or informally on-the-job. Koike
and Inoki (1990) evidence what they with
reason call ‘a phenomenal growth of up-
grading training’ in leading Japanese firms
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across sectors following the impact of the first
OPEC oil price increases in September 1973.
At the time, in reaction to falling rates of
growth of global demand, western firms were
laying off workers and dispersing their skills.
In the Japanese case they were continually
up-grading them. On job rotation and
variation, workers in leading Japanese
companies can spend some years in
production, some in marketing, some in cost
control and accounts, some in relations with
supplier companies. Spending time with
suppliers facilitates ‘voice’ rather than ‘exit’
(Hirschman, 1970). Not understanding how a
supplier could assure both quality and a low
price for a component, Toyota, again, invited
itself to visit it, and came to realise that it was
spending too little on R&D. It agreed to
increase the price paid for the component on
condition that the company developed its
R&D division and developed its own
innovation trajectory (direct enquiry). Job
rotation also facilitates understanding of both
the scope and constraints facing other parts
of an organisation or a production plant. On
these principles, the middle managers in
Volkswagen’s Autoeuropa plant in Portugal
have initiated an ‘in my shoes’ policy by which
they spend the equivalent of several weeks a
year working alongside other managers, such
as the manager for cost control with a
production manager, in a manner in which the
implicit conflict of their demands can be better
understood and reconciled (FEUC
Autoeuropa, 2004).
Some commentators have suggested that
both Toyota and the auto industry are special
cases and that other sectors of the Japanese
economy are more typical of inflexible Fordist
mass production. Wood (1989, p. 33) has
argued of flexible production that ‘nothing in
these innovations implies an end to mass
production’. Berggren (1989, p. 172) has
claimed that the Japanese are ‘the modern
masters’ of standardisation and Taylorist task
segmentation. But we submit that this is
misconceived. Of course, Toyota is into mass
production, otherwise it would not be about to
overtake General Motors as the world’s no. 1
auto producer. But its paradigm is not
inflexible mass production of standardised
products but flexible, customised volume
production. It is flexible production as a
flexible response to individualised demand
that enables Japanese consumers to identify
eighty or more specifications that they want in
or on ‘their’ vehicle and have it delivered to
and for them within days (direct enquiry). 
Otherwise, Japanese flexible production is not
Berggren’s (1989) ‘modern mastery of
Taylorism’ but its inverse. In Taylor’s (1911)
operational logic, what was to be done was
according to his ‘scientific management’, and
decided top-down. The instruction needed to
do a job was minimal because the task was
so, with Taylor notoriously claiming that if you
gave him a man for minutes he would train
him for life. Taylor did not want craftsmen who
were multi-skilled and multi-tasked because
his design was to reduce labour to its least
possible task, and de-skilling rather than re-
skilling (Lacey, 1987). It was because his
shop floor experience showed him that
workers skilled in multiple tasks could slow
down the pace of work that he had designed a
de-skilled production system (Monin & Monin,
2003). Taylorism is the inverse of the Toyota
production system in which the main aim is to
achieve multi-tasking through multi-skilling,
and continuous improvement in methods of
work operation suggested by employees
rather than designed top-down in a Taylorist
manner (Womack et al, 1990; Womack & and
Jones, 2005). Taylorism also is by definition
inflexible. His presumption that there was ‘one
best way’ meant that it could not be changed
once achieved unless top-down by a new
‘scientific’ operational design. Such a Taylorist
operational logic excludes organisational
learning. Toyota’s is based on it.
The further claim that Toyota and the auto
industry are special cases is correct but in
degree rather than in kind. Continuous
improvement for years has been integral to all
Japanese management thinking in bigger
business (Nonaka, 1994, 1998; Colenso,
2000). And, even within the Japanese auto
industry, Toyota has been exceptional rather
than typical. It has been up to five times more
productive per employee than other vehicle
producers such as Mazda; Mitsubishi has run
into difficulties; Nissan’s own problems
prompted its joint venture with Renault. But
Carlos Ghosn of Renault in reverse learned
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2. Flexible Production in Context
from the operational practice of kaizen style
continuous improvement in Japan. And
Toyota still is the global production
pacemaker in terms of both process and
product innovation. Its hybrid Prius is gaining
global volume at 200.000 vehicles a year at a
time when US companies are calling for
federal subsidies even to develop hybrid
technology. To claim that the Toyota
production system does not represent a
paradigm for other industry is as useful as to
claim that Fordism as a production paradigm
is meaningless because it also originated in
the auto industry.
None of which implies that Toyota gets
everything right all the time. With other
Japanese auto producers it can make big
mistakes, as it did in with its first European
FDI foray at Burnaston in Derbyshire in 1992,
finding that European consumers did not want
‘bland boxes’, even if they were fault free. As
Thierry Dombreval, head of sales for Toyota
recently put it: ‘We didn’t have a product that
really appealed to the European customer in
terms of exterior or interior design, powertrain
or driving dynamics’, and the break even
point of 200,000 vehicles a year at Burnaston,
only after entirely new models, took another
five years (Mackintosh, 2006a). But the
difference between a culture of commitment
to continuous improvement meant that Toyota
learned and reacted, within half a decade,
whereas the US auto majors have failed to do
so for decades, still producing models that,
other than 4x4 pick-ups, US consumers did
not want, not least because they were
unreliable (Mackintosh, 2006b).
Also, if approaching a Weberian ideal type in
production efficiency (Weber, 1947), the
Japanese flexible production model should
not be idealised. In Japan it involves varying
degrees of implicit constraint. Non
performance or non compliance can result in
loss of promotion which, in a system where
pay in the main has been through seniority,
can mean both loss of income and loss of
face. Where Japanese firms have
transplanted flexible production to other
countries without guaranteeing lifetime
employment, or offering profit sharing, case
studies have found it to be as much ‘mean’ as
‘lean’. Tacit resistance and high labour
turnover are common in several Japanese
transplants, just as they were under Fordist
mass production (Parker and Slaughter,
1988; Garrahan and Stewart, 1992; Wilkinson
et al.2001). 
Nor is it feasible in most cases to replicate
Japanese lifetime employment in Europe for
those companies exposed to globalisation,
even if they could well be advised to offer no
involuntary redundancy agreements for the
lifetime of a product or product range, which
could have a similar effect in terms of
increasing willingness to suggest methods of
work operation and continuous improvement.
Many European companies have managed
the ‘big leap’ from Fordist standardised mass
production and inflexible economies of scale
to post Fordist flexible economies of scope,
and especially the auto majors. But it is
evident that those that now are opting for
longer working hours rather than continuous
improvement are failing to maximise the
‘small steps’ of kaizen or ‘continuous
improvement’ which has given leading
Japanese firms their competitive advantage in
global markets (Colenso, 2000) despite
having some of the highest real wages and
social benefits in the world. 
Meanwhile, as Toyota is set to become no. 1
in the world auto league, General Motors,
Ford and Daimler-Chrysler are finding
themselves either with the wrong vehicles
(GM) or increased faults and loss of quality
with expanded production (Daimler-Chrysler’s
Mercedes division) and, with Ford, committed
to tens of thousands of redundancies in both
Europe and the US (Milne, 2005; Milne &
Mackintosh 2006). The fact that the big three
in the US, despite some renegotiation, are
faced also with private health and pensions
for former employees equivalent to adding
$1.500 or more to the cost of a vehicle is
giving rise to claims that they may need to file
for chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings unless
they are bailed out by the federal
government. GM has used this prospect to
gain wage cuts and reduce pension rights
from the UAW (Simon & Mackintosh, 2006).
But this is a defensive tactic, not a long-term
strategy. And it is in particular their failure to
achieve continuous improvement that
underlies the long run competitive failure of
the US auto majors (The Economist, 2004a,
2005). 
Innovation-by-Agreement: Activating the Lisbon Agenda Forum
For instance, GM should know everything
there is to know about flexible production and
post Fordism since it entered a joint venture
in 1986 with Toyota in the NUMMI production
facility with Toyota in California (Womack at
al.,1990). But while it learned the operational
logic of production flexibility and just-in-time
components delivery, GM focussed on
flexible production as a technique rather than
on continuous improvement as an
organisational paradigm. It prioritised cost
rather than innovation, and thereafter took
organizational decisions that were the inverse
of the Toyota hand-in-hand relations with
suppliers and concern to develop joint
innovation trajectories. It hived off its internal
components division to an independent
company, Delphi Automotive Parts which, in
2005 filed for bankruptcy (The Economist,
2005). Yet it is this failure to grasp that
flexible production as a paradigm is both
about reducing costs and continuous process
innovation and quality control that underlies
the long term competitive failure of the US
majors. For, even with lower productivity
levels in the States than in Japan, the
Japanese transplants in the US can produce
and sell a fault free vehicle for $1.500 less
than the big three which, with higher health
and pension charges, gives an average
vehicle differential of $3.000 (The Economist,
2004a). 
– Local and Global Context 
Lifetime employment never included more
than a seventh of the total Japanese labour
force. Much of the rest of the Japanese
economy has been less than efficient to
hyper-inefficient in terms of employment
levels, as in its high cost agriculture, and
highly staffed services, including banks. But
this has been an implicit societal choice, to
ensure high employment levels and social
cohesion, supported by transfer of the
efficiency gains from its world leading
companies to the rest of the economy through
taxation. 
Therefore in services, and not least banking
the Japanese economy is not flexible, waste
cutting or ‘lean’ (Womack at al., 1990;
Womack & Jones, 2005). Japan’s recession
in the 1990’s was due to over inflation of
property values, loans made on this basis,
and defaults and contraction in a major
banking crisis when the bubble burst. Yet the
long recession in Japan in the 1990’s also
was not due to a loss of efficiency in its
leading firms but in key part to their
successful export from the 1980’s of its high
efficiency, flexible production model through
direct investment to the United States and
Europe. Up to a third of their global
production now is abroad (The Economist,
2005). Japanese production in these major
markets substituted for a large share of
Japanese exports to them, and thus slowed
Japan’s economic growth. This effect was
noted by Bertil Ohlin in the book for which he
gained the Nobel Prize (Ohlin, 1933) but has
been neglected by economists ever since. 
Ohlin’s parallel argument that countries will
tend to specialize trade in the factor in which
they have a comparative abundance, i.e.
capital rich countries in capital goods and
poorer countries in labour intensive goods
gained prominence in the form of the
Hecksher-Ohlin theory, but has been
superceded since multinational companies
now can combine low cost labour in emerging
economies with intensive use of capital and
technology. Yet it was not access to lower
cost labour that attracted Japanese firms to
the US and Europe, but fear of protection,
especially from the US, if their greater
competitiveness were to decimate the
domestic market dominance of US
companies, a fear well illustrated by George
W. Bush trying to resort to protection for steel,
and pressures against liberalisation by US
farmers and textile producers. Again, such a
tariff effect in promoting FDI had been
identified by identified by Ohlin (1933).
During Japan’s 1990’s recession, and not
least following the financial crisis of over
exposure of its banks, there were intermittent
reports that lifetime employment in Japan was
finished. And its context has been changing.
Some companies in Japan have been out
sourcing more employment. And there has
been an increase in part time employment,
not least with increased feminisation of the
labour force. During the recession, most
leading firms introduced a combination of
hiring freezes and early retirement to reduce
labour costs. The close links of leading
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companies to keiretsu banks in several cases
have been loosened, as the banks addressed
their own problems, and restructured. But
pronouncements of death of the lifetime
employment paradigm are premature. It
remains central to the international
competitive advantage of its leading
Japanese firms. As Pilling has put it,
Japanese companies ‘have managed to
reinvent themselves without aping the Anglo-
Saxon model’ (Pilling, 2006). Canon, which
flirted with shorter term contracts, has
reconfirmed the principle of employment from
graduation to retirement for the central
reasons of building cumulative skill
trajectories, and keeping workers’ knowledge,
skills and experience ‘in house’. As Fujio
Mitarai, President of Canon, has stressed, the
company thereby gets a workforce which is
constantly relearning while Canon also keeps
its process innovations secrets inside the
company (Pilling, 2004). 
Consistent with Fujio Mitarai’s claims, it now
is widely recognised in management theory
and organisational psychology that one of the
main competitive advantages of firms is the
tacit knowledge that their employees have
accumulated from non-formal learning at
work. This interest builds on the work of
Michael Polanyi (1958, 1962), for whom tacit
knowledge is procedural ‘know how’ rather
than semantic ‘know that’. Reber (1976,
1989) pioneered the concept of ‘implicit
learning’ in the context of tacit knowledge.
Nonaka (1994) claims that organisational
knowledge has four dimensions: tacit and
individual; tacit and collective; explicit and
individual, and explicit and collective, and has
drawn on Japanese evidence to illustrate this.
As he also puts it, giving examples from NEC,
Sharp, Canon, Matsushita, Honda and other
companies, when tacit and explicit knowledge
interact: 
‘Something powerful happens. It is
precisely this exchange between tacit and
explicit knowledge that Japanese
companies are good at developing…
What’s more, as new explicit knowledge is
shared throughout an organization, other
employees begin to internalize it – that is,
they use it to broaden, extend and reframe
their own tacit knowledge’ (Nonaka, 1998,
pp 29, 31). 
In analysing corporate performance in
international case studies, Baumard (1999)
has stylised ‘individual and collective’
knowledge modes which are either explicit or
tacit. For Ambrosini and Bowman 2001) tacit
knowledge is ‘deeply engrained’ in people or
organisations, while abilities or skills may be
unrecognised simply because “people never
thought of what they were doing, they never
asked themselves what they were doing, and
nobody else ever asked it either” (ibid, p.
816). Innovation-by-agreement is designed
precisely to remedy this by identifying tacit
knowledge, latent abilities and implicit skills
through social dialogue, and projecting them
in new joint ‘innovation trajectories’ of mutual
advantage to both local plant management
and other employees.
Recognition of the efficiency derived from
tacit knowledge, and mobilising latent abilities
and implicit skills through social dialogue
contrasts markedly with recent fashions for
classifying employees’ knowledge as Human
Capital (Becker, 1964) or Intellectual Capital
(Edvinsson, 1997, 2000). This not only begs
the question who ‘owns’ the stock or flow of
such imputed capital and in whose interest it
is deployed. Both Human Capital and
Intellectual Capital theory stress formal
qualifications and inputs because they can be
measured, when the knowledge of those who
best know what could be improved is mainly
tacit, and how it has been learned implicit
(Reber,1976, 1989). One of the most
commonly cited arguments in the context of
globalisation - Porter’s ‘competitive
advantage’ - is widely recognised to depend
on tacit knowledge despite the fact that Porter
himself makes no reference to it, attributing
continuous improvement to technology rather
than the labour process, and claiming that it
has diminishing returns (Porter, 1998). 
– Transplanting Gains
Where the Japanese flexible production and
kaizen style continuous improvement model
have been translated with success, this in
some cases has been because it fits with pre-
existing work attitudes and values. Consistent
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with Riesman’s (1954) distinction of ‘other
directed’ and ‘self directed’ work, Swedish
workers have found that kaizen is a set of
practices and ideas, or ‘technologies of the
self’, that enable them to ‘take care of
operations’ (Styhre, 2001). But they have
done so in large part because this was the
farming tradition which shaped attitudes to
work in the transition of Sweden from an
agricultural to industrial society, and in
particular the ‘fix it’ rather than ‘send for help’
culture typical of isolated farms (Styhre, op. cit). 
In China, innovation in new methods of work
organization varies between companies and
sectors, as does quality. According to Hal
Sirkin of the Boston Consulting Group, some
big car makers initially reconfigured their
capital-labour ratios in China to use more
labour in their Chinese plant (The Economist,
2004). A major recent World Bank sponsored
study into the vehicles sector found that in
key components Chinese firms have moved
to high levels of capital intensity, using robot
welding, even if as yet using a higher level of
manning on robots than is customary in high
wage countries. As the report says: ‘By so
doing, they can achieve major cost savings
by attaining levels of scrap losses that are
extremely low relative to international best
practice’.(Sutton, 2004). So, certainly, some
companies in China are learning flexible or
‘lean production’.
However, it should not be assumed that major
relocations because of lower labour costs
necessarily can match the efficiency gains
feasible from continuous improvement in
developed industrial countries. Neither
Volkswagen nor Siemens have made a
success of their low cost labour operations in
China. Early into China, by 2004 VW saw its
market share fall from nearly half of the FDI
auto market in China to single figures.
Siemens has failed both in Europe and in
China with cordless and mobile telephones
and within a year of gaining longer hours for
the same pay in its plant in its German plant
sold both of them and its China operations to a
Taiwanese company (Wassener & Hille, 2005).
Some of the reasons, and the formidable
operational gains that can be made in high
wage countries from drawing on workers’ tacit
knowledge and implicit skills are apparent
from an analysis of Japanese-Thai and
Japanese-Malay joint ventures in different
sectors, in which a University of Tokyo study
found that even where the Thai or Malay
ventures were using newer plant and
technology, their efficiency ranged from only
one fourth to one third that of the Japanese
partner companies’ production in Japan
(Koike and Inoki, 1990). Holding capital and
labour constant, they attribute productivity
differences to the differences in skills and
experience of the respective labour forces.
They stress that such skills for the most part
are derived from informal work experience
and innovative work practices and noted a
phenomenal growth of ‘up grading training’ in
Japan from the time of the impact of the first
oil crisis in 1973. This is customised to what
workers already have learned in on-the-job
training and is an extension and formalisation
of informal skills (Koike and Inoke, ibid. pp
237-238). They also note that efficiency is
greatly improved when production workers
are able to point out ‘some part of the process
that should be modified according to their
own experience’ and add that for this ‘such
workers must know both the structure of the
machines and the logic of the production
process’ (Koike and Inoke, ibid. p.9). 
It therefore is by drawing on implicit skills and
with commitment of both management and
labour to continuous improvement, that high
wage cost Japan for decades has been able
to keep ahead of low cost Asia even when the
Asian firms concerned are using the same or
more modern technology, and the same or
similar methods of work organisation. This is
why Toyota, with high labour costs and with a
strong yen, continue to be more competitive
from Japan than any other world auto
producer. It also implies that European firms
still located in the EU-15 can in principle
achieve major efficiency gains if they and
their employees can mutually commit to
continuous improvement. 
By contrast, lengthening working time for the
same pay without continuous improvement
already can be one foot in the grave for the
plant concerned, its workers and its local
management, as already has been the case in
Germany. When most companies were
national, their operating management tended
to side with the interests of owners and
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shareholders rather than employees. However,
the classic oppositional tactics of national
management and national unions now are
being transformed by the need for plant
management and unions to cooperate in
achieving efficiency gains precisely under the
threat that, unless they achieve them, the
company for which they both work will
relocate. For, if production is relocated either
elsewhere in Europe, or outside Europe, the
jobs of local management also are in question.
Even if some of them are offered postings
elsewhere, few of them will be willing to take
them if this means leaving or relocating their
partners or families. Both employees and
managers at plant level therefore have
formidable incentives to achieve efficiency
gains through social dialogue. 
This is evident from a case study of
Autoeuropa in Portugal, where management
and employees were able to pull it to near top
in Volkswagen’s European efficiency league
table. Autoeuropa made the ‘big leap’ to post
Fordist methods of flexible work operation but
also did so in terms that have ‘internalised’
the operational psychology of continuous
improvement in precisely Nonaka’s (1994,
1998) and Baumard’s (1999) sense. With
each new model, unlike Taylor’s (1911) ‘one
best way’, there is a learning curve because
continuing improvement is possible.
Autoeuropa still is only on the mid slopes of
this with its current model. It also is
constrained because it is a one-car plant,
where the model is chosen for it rather than
by it. Which vehicle it can produce, on what
design, and with which components, is
decided entirely by head office management.
If market demand for the model is not strong,
this feeds back into strains on the principle
that employees in times of slack demand,
should be redeployed or offered leave rather
than made redundant. Nonetheless, the
discretion of local managers and employees
in seeking new methods of work operation
through continuous improvement has been
total, and Autoeuropa have made the most of
it through mutual voice and dialogue within
individual work groups, and between different
groups and managers. Within wider global
constraints, it has shown that in terms of
operational efficiency ‘Portugal Can
Compete’, and do so well (FEUC, 2005).
Such involvement of employees in change,
and enabling them to give ‘internal voice’ at
all levels is vital for operational learning and
innovation, whether the context is radical,
such as transition from inflexible Fordist to
flexible post Fordist production, or
evolutionary in the sense of successive small
steps achieving continuous improvement
(Oliveira & Holland, 1998; Colenso, 2000).
And such voice is vital if flexible production
and continuous improvement is to be gained
on the basis of consent. 
What emerges from international evidence on
worker participation (Heller, op cit.) is that the
essence of a learning organisation is not only
a style of leadership which encourages and
recognises such learning, but proactive
participation in proposals for either
organisational or operational change. To be
effective these should be ‘middle-up’ (middle
management to plant level or plant
management to organisation level) and ‘base-
up’ (any employee or group of employees)
rather than only ‘top-down’. The organisation
therefore becomes more self-directed
(Riesman, 1954) in its learning from the tacit
knowledge, latent abilities and implicit skills of
its workforce than ‘other-directed’ by only top-
down design for change. 
This does not mean that there should not be
an initial conception or design for operational
or organisational change. Someone has to
start the process, whether senior corporate
management, or plant management, or
employees, through a trades union. Yet
Argyris and Schön (1974, 1996.) have found
from widespread international case studies
that the failure to achieve deep ‘double loop’
learning of the kind implied by a paradigm
shift is mainly by top and middle
management. Resistance to paradigmatic
change also can confront the tacit norms and
implicit rules of what other employees think is
to be, or ought to be done, or not done
(Oliveira, 2002). Proposals for change in
operational logic also are unlikely to succeed
unless they make allowance for what Pascale
(1990) calls ‘creative dissent’. Feedback by
middle management on an initial proposal for
a change in operational or organisational
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logic from top management may be common.
Asking employees themselves what they
could do with their skills and experience is
less so. Asking them also to propose rather
than react to changes in methods of work
operation is uncommon. Yet proposals of the
kind vital for continuous improvement are
more likely to succeed if they can be made by
employees at all levels and given voice
through dialogue of the kind which can
achieve both operational and thereby
organisational learning and improvement.
And this is central to the case for innovation-
by-agreement.
– Mutual Advantage 
Innovation-by-agreement therefore offers
dialogue on organisational learning and
innovation not only in terms of employees
responding to change decided already by
management, but how they and middle
management can contribute to it in a manner
which is of mutual advantage to themselves
and the organisation.
On the other hand, as already stressed,
European companies faced with global
competition and increased market insecurity,
may be able to offer employees profit sharing
within various bonus schemes, but cannot
readily assure them lifetime employment. It
was for this reason that the background paper
recommending innovation-by-agreement to
the Portuguese Presidency of the European
Council (Holland, 2000) proposed:
1. The right to negotiate the incidence of
work time and personal or life time. 
2. The right to formal skills extension in the
context of skills path planning and
‘customised’ training extending the informal
skills of groups of workers. 
3. Recognition of implicit skills and
experience and explicit skills extension in
the form of job redesign and re-
designation.
4. The right to propose new methods of
work operation.
Innovation-by-agreement is a process. The
commitment in Japan to lifetime employment
and profit sharing is not explicit in terms of an
employment contract but closer to what Guest
(2003, 2004) and others have called a
‘psychological contract’. This works in Japan
because it has been embodied in both custom
and practice for decades. In Europe, not least
in view of the seismic shifts since 2004, mutual
advantage is more likely to be achieved if the
organisation can gain consent to flexible
production and continuous improvement, while
employees have the right to enhance personal
fulfilment at work and to negotiate a more
flexible balance between their work life and
family or social life. Further, such a mutual
advantage paradigm has the potential to
combine what Japanese models of continuous
improvement have not: both economic
efficiency for the enterprise and social
efficiency in the sense of more effectively
meeting the personal needs of employees.
Innovation-by-agreement does not exclude
parallel or integrated bargaining over pay and
working conditions. It is not a substitute for
increased pay justified by efficiency increases
or increased sales. Nor is it a substitute for
promotion. But part of its force is precisely
that the process should extend collective
bargaining beyond pay and working
conditions to enhance the economic and
social efficiency of enterprise, and facilitate
continuous improvement in learning
organisations. The challenge of
individualising rights and life time needs
within a collective bargaining framework is
demanding. But the principle of innovation-by-
agreement can be included in a collective
bargaining agreement, with the practice being
an ongoing process of social dialogue at plant
level and the rights of individual workers or
groups of workers to negotiate the incidence
of working time. The process can:
• include both managers and workers,
rather than just managers or just workers;
• enable individual proposals for new
methods of work or task operation to be
individually recognised and credited;
• allow non-formal learning-from-work to be
recognised and credited in terms of job
redesign or re-designation; 
• combine flexible methods of work
organisation with job variation and job
rotation to offset alienation from doing one
job and one job only; 
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• facilitate customised training and
‘enhanced competence profiling’ to extend
and diversify the application of skills; 
• enable skills path planning for both
managers and workers rather than only
career planning for upper levels of
management;
• enhance the relation of non-work life to
life at work by allowing negotiation of the
incidence of individual or group working
time to non-work time to suit family or other
personal needs; 
• recognise overtime working as ‘time
credits’ which workers or managers later
can draw on as ‘undertime’ when they may,
on an agreed basis, take time off for
recreation, further education or training, or
for enhanced family time. 
Time credits negotiated within the context of
an innovation-by-agreement framework
therefore would allow for overtime by a
significant share of the workforce when
market conditions demanded it, but allow
workers the right to offset this by being able to
customise the incidence of their working time.
In this context trades unions might choose to
negotiate individual work and life time
agreements within three broad categories: (a)
younger employees who have, or as yet have,
no children; (b) employees choosing to extend
maternity and paternity leave to care for
children, and (c) older employees with no
direct family responsibilities. Being able to
draw on overtime credits therefore could be
customised to individual needs and
significantly enhance quality of life, while
allowing management greater flexibility in
terms of working time, within a negotiated
framework. 
Again, it is consistent with the principle of
innovation-by-agreement that new methods of
work operation should fully involve those at
the most relevant level in the organisation in
their design, and that the aim of the redesign
should be mutual advantage. It is on such a
basis, building on and extending the Toyota
production paradigm that one can gain both
economic flexibility-by-consent and social
efficiency-by-consent in the sense of enabling
employees to reconcile personal needs with
work needs. 
Trades unions have to act at a national and
international level. They must do so on a
delegate basis. But plant level bargaining
through a process such as innovation-by-
agreement is well suited to more direct
democracy. It also can work in general public
administration and services rather than only
in footloose manufacturing. Continuous
improvement negotiated through innovation-
by-agreement therefore need not be limited to
the production sphere or private services. It
can include: 
1. the right of workers and managers in
both the private and public sectors to
expect negotiation to range beyond wages
and working conditions and to include the
relation between their work and non-work
lives as well as retraining, job redesign,
skills path planning and career planning.
2. the degree to which personalisation of
service and ‘continuous improvement’ in
education, health, public administration and
other public services can directly benefit
the public, enhance social efficiency and
improve the quality of life.
This is a broad agenda, but one that offers a
paradigmatic alternative to the presumption of
most governments that the only was to
increase efficiency in the social sphere or
public administration is to cut costs by cutting
employment and extending working hours,
either within a week, or year, or within a
working lifetime, as now being proposed in
Portugal by the government for hospital
administration. Alternative paradigms for such
organisation, modelled on post Fordist and
post Taylorist principles (Oliveira & Holland,
2006) indicate that units costs can be
reduced and the quality of patient service
improved by redeploying the tacit knowledge
and implicit skills of health workers, with job
enhancement through re-design, rather than
postponing retirement, or reducing
employment.
We therefore suggest that innovation-by-
agreement, as intended by the Lisbon
Agenda, can offer new efficiency paradigms
both for both an economy and for society. It
can achieve positive sum internal economies
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in terms of new methods of work operation
based on consent because the process
reinforces individual rights. But it also offers
positive externalities for society as a whole.
This obtains for health, but also for education.
This in the main, especially at secondary and
tertiary levels, still is Fordist mass production
of learning. It now is less ‘educare’ of the kind
which Rousseau advocated in Émile
(Rousseau, 1960), in the sense of the leading
out of a self-directed individual into society
with widened experience and understanding,
than ‘inducare’ or induction into narrower
areas of Taylorist specialisation (Oliveira &
Holland, 1998; Atkinson and Claxton, 2000;
Mintzberg, 2004). 
Such a contrast between ‘education’ and
‘induction’ also is a central issue for the
lifelong learning of the Lisbon Agenda
inasmuch as many of the skills which people
need to extend by customised training are
implicit in their learning-from-work or learning-
from-life, rather than formally or professionally
acquired. As confirmed in our four country
case study for the European Commission
(Oliveira, 2003), lifelong learning (or LLL),
needs to distinguish and integrate non-formal
learning-from-work (LfW), and informal
learning-from-life (LfL). Especially, skills
profiling as the basis for skill path planning
can and should personalise or customise
retraining for individual workers or groups of
workers with already given skills. This can
enhance and extend what they already can
do well at work and in life, rather than being
formally trained to do things they have never
done, nor are sure they can do well. This
methodology, based on recognising tacit
knowledge, latent abilities and implicit skills
directly informed the Lisbon Agenda case that
the Commission and member states should
‘encourage agreements between the social
partners on innovation and lifelong learning
by exploiting the complementarity between
lifelong learning and adaptability through
flexible management of working time and job
rotation’ (European Council, 2000).
Therefore the Lisbon Agenda indeed was
ambitious, but in under-recognised and still
feasible ways. Its case for ‘agreements
between the social partners on innovation’
were designed to enhance not only
competitiveness but also service to the public,
whether in health, education, public
administration or local services. In Weber’s
(1947) sense of articulated hierarchy and
division of labour, many public sector services
have become bureaucratic not because they
have no profit motive, but because
employees who best know how they could be
remedied or made more responsive to the
public have no voice through social dialogue
to propose innovation in methods of work
operation on the basis of mutual advantage.
In these regards, innovation-by-agreement
arguably represents both a project for
economic efficiency in the competitive
sphere, and a wider project for society itself. It
is precisely in such regards that the ambition
of the Lisbon Agenda to re-launch the
European Social Agenda both makes sense,
and could be activated. 
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